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Abstract—Software engineers can find vulnerabilities with less effort if they are directed towards code that might contain more
vulnerabilities. HARMLESS is an incremental support vector machine tool that builds a vulnerability prediction model from the source
code inspected to date, then suggests what source code files should be inspected next. In this way, HARMLESS can reduce the time
and effort required to achieve some desired level of recall for finding vulnerabilities. The tool also provides feedback on when to stop (at
that desired level of recall) while at the same time, correcting human errors by double-checking suspicious files.
This paper evaluates HARMLESS on Mozilla Firefox vulnerability data. HARMLESS found 80, 90, 95, 99% of the vulnerabilities by
inspecting 10, 16, 20, 34% of the source code files. When targeting 90, 95, 99% recall, HARMLESS could stop after inspecting 23, 30,
47% of the source code files. Even when human reviewers fail to identify half of the vulnerabilities (50% false negative rate), HARMLESS
could detect 96% of the missing vulnerabilities by double-checking half of the inspected files.
Our results serve to highlight the very steep cost of protecting software from vulnerabilities (in our case study that cost is, for
example, the human effort of inspecting 28,750 × 20% = 5,750 source code files to identify 95% of the vulnerabilities). While this
result could benefit the mission-critical projects where human resources are available for inspecting thousands of source code files, the
research challenge for future work is how to further reduce that cost. The conclusion of this paper discusses various ways that goal
might be achieved.
Index Terms—Active learning, security, vulnerabilities, software engineering, error correction.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Software security is a current and urgent issue. A recent report [1]
from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) warns that “current systems perform increasingly vital
tasks and are widely known to possess vulnerabilities”. The
vulnerabilities discussed in this paper are defined as follows:
• A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to
gain access to a system or network; or
• A mistake that lets attackers violate a security policy [2].
Government and scientific bodies stress the need for reducing
software vulnerabilities. In a report to the White House Of-
fice of Science and Technology Policy, “Dramatically Reducing
Software Vulnerabilities” [1], NIST encourages more research
on approaches to reduce security vulnerabilities. The need to
reduce vulnerabilities is also emphasized in the 2016 US Federal
Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan [3].
To protect against software vulnerabilities, teams need to
detect and fix the vulnerabilities before deployment. In this paper,
we focus on the “detect” part of this process. Code inspection is
a key process for vulnerability detection. Such inspections require
software engineers to inspect large amounts of code (e.g. check
that no call to the “C” printf function can be supplied a
format string that is mismatched to the type of the items being
printed). Resource limitations often preclude software engineers
to inspect all source code files [4]. Making informed decisions
on what source code files to inspect can improve a team’s ability
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to find vulnerabilities. Vulnerability prediction models (VPMs)
make such informed decisions by learning a machine learning
model from known vulnerabilities. The model is then applied to
classify source code files as “vulnerable” or “non-vulnerable”. If
software engineers only inspect the predicted “vulnerable” files,
then human effort is reduced. That is, a good VPM helps human
to find more vulnerabilities by inspecting less code.
Although the state-of-the-art VPMs have shown promising
results on finding vulnerabilities with reduced human inspection
effort [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], these approaches have limitations:
• VPMs learn models using training data which describes known
vulnerabilities. Prior to the initial release, such data may not be
available1.
• Existing VPMs do not allow users to choose what level of recall
(percentage of vulnerabilities found) to reach. Moreover, when
software engineers finish inspecting the selected source code
files, they do not know how many more vulnerabilities are as-
yet-undetected in the remaining code.
• Humans may inspect a file but fail to find vulnerabilities [11].
Double checking (where files are inspected by other humans)
is needed to cover such errors. Current VPM research does not
discuss how to design cost-effective double-checking strategies.
The central insight of this paper is that the vulnerability prediction
problem (finding more vulnerabilities by inspecting less code)
belongs to a class of information retrieval problem—the total
recall [12] problem (described in §2.2). An active learning-based
framework has been shown effective to resolve all the above-
mentioned limitation for total recall problems in another domain—
1. Transferring training data may not solve this problem. Cross project
vulnerability prediction has been shown to perform worse than within project
vulnerability prediction [10].
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2selecting relevant papers for literature reviews [13]. This paper
checks the conjecture that this active learning-based framework
for selecting relevant papers can be applied and adapted to help
find vulnerabilities efficiently while mitigating the limitations of
current vulnerability prediction approaches. That said, in this
paper, a novel direction is presented to assist software engineers
in identifying vulnerabilities efficiently. A vulnerability inspection
tool HARMLESS is built by applying and adapting the active
learning-based framework for selecting relevant papers. Using
HARMLESS, engineers inspect some source code files while
HARMLESS trains/updates a VPM based on the inspection re-
sults. Then HARMLESS applies the VPM to suggest which files
should be inspected next. Through iterating this process, HARM-
LESS guides the human inspection efforts towards source code
files that are more likely to contain vulnerabilities. An interesting
finding here is that the active learning-based framework can be
applied to vulnerability prediction problem (as HARMLESS) with
barely any modification. This means two things—firstly we can
improve vulnerability inspection efficiency by recasting the prob-
lem in terms of total recall. Secondly, in the future, innovations
in the solution of any total recall problem, including vulnerability
prediction, can improve all other total recall problems including
vulnerability prediction. This is an exciting line of research since
this suggests a synthesis of many (seemingly different) lines of
research.
This paper assesses the effectiveness of HARMLESS by
simulating code inspections on C and C++ files from Mozilla
Firefox project. The authors tagged the known vulnerabilities
of the Mozilla Firefox project from Mozilla Foundation Secu-
rity Advisories blog [14] and bug reports from Bugzilla2 up to
November 21st, 2017. Among the 28,750 unique source code
files, 271 files contain vulnerabilities. These known vulnerable
files are treated as ground truth. Note that our dataset does not
provide information on whether an actual incident was caused by
the identified ground truth vulnerabilities. During our file-level
simulations, when a human is asked to inspect a source code
file and tell whether it contains vulnerabilities or not, the ground
truth is applied instead of a real code inspection. This enables our
experiments to be repeated multiple times with different algorithm
setups and provides reproducibility of this paper. For full details
on that data, see §4.
Using this data, we explore four research questions to see
whether HARMLESS can better resolve the aforementioned limi-
tations of traditional VPMs:
RQ1: Can human inspection effort be saved by applying
HARMLESS to find a certain percentage of vulnerabilities?
Simulated on the Mozilla Firefox data without prior known vul-
nerabilities as training data, we show that 60, 70, 80, 90, 95, 99%
of the known vulnerabilities can be found by inspecting around
6, 8, 10, 16, 20, 34% of the source code files, respectively. These
results show that a good amount of human effort can be saved by
applying HARMLESS. This result also highlights the very steep
costs associated with protecting software from vulnerabilities.
Even with our best methods, for the Mozilla Firefox dataset
studied here, humans still need to manually inspect 28,750× 20%
= 5,750 source code files to identify 95% of the vulnerabilities.
While this result could benefit the mission-critical projects where
human resources are available for inspecting thousands of source
code files (as done in [15]), the clear research challenge for future
2. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/
work is how to further reduce that cost. The conclusion of this
paper offers some notes on how that goal might be achieved.
Note that these RQ1 results assume that humans are infallible;
i.e. they make no mistakes in their inspections (see RQ3, RQ4 for
what happens when humans become fallible).
RQ2: Can HARMLESS correctly stop the vulnerability
inspection when a predetermined percentage of vulnerabilities
has been found?
We show that HARMLESS can accurately estimate the number
of remaining vulnerable files in a project. Based on the estimation,
HARMLESS can tell humans when they should stop the inspec-
tion (i.e. when they have found the predetermined percentage of
vulnerabilities). Our results also suggest that HARMLESS tends
to slightly over-estimate the number of remaining vulnerable files,
e.g. when targeting 95% recall, the inspection stopped at 97%
recall with 30% cost, which means 97% of the vulnerable files
can be identified by inspecting 8,625 source code files. Compared
to the result of RQ1, about 3,000 more files need to be inspected
due to the small estimation error of HARMLESS. Hence, it is very
important to further improve the estimation since a tiny reduction
in its error can lead to the saving of a large amount of effort.
RQ3: Is HARMLESS’s performance affected by human
errors? Hatton [11] warns that when inspecting codes for defects,
human fails to detect 47% of the defects (47% false negative rate
and 0% false positive rate) in average. We assume the same error
rate for vulnerability inspections. By adding in 10 to 50% false
negative rate to the simulated human oracles randomly, we simu-
late the influence of growing human error rate on HARMLESS’s
performance. Such human errors drastically and negatively impact
the inspection result, thus motivating the next research question.
RQ4: Can HARMLESS correct human errors effectively?
As seen in our simulations in §5.4, HARMLESS outperforms
the state-of-the-art error correction mechanisms by only double-
checking 50% of the inspected files but covering 96% of the miss-
ing vulnerabilities. According to our results, when targeting 95%
recall with human having 50% chance of missing a vulnerability
during the inspection, HARMLESS can reach 0.95×0.85 = 81%
recall for 0.21× 1.86 = 39% cost, which means 81% of the vul-
nerable files can be identified by inspecting 11,230 files (including
double checks). If the reader finds this to be an excessive amount,
then they might want to consider what has to happen without our
tools:
• Without HARMLESS, one engineer would only find 50% of the
vulnerabilities, and only after inspecting 28,750 files (100% of
the files);
• Without HARMLESS, two engineers would find 75% of the
vulnerabilities, but only after inspecting 57,500 files (200% of
the files including double-checking effort).
1.1 Contributions of this Paper
1) Here in this paper we present a different direction to assist
software engineers identifying potential vulnerabilities effi-
ciently. Instead of training a model to predict vulnerabilities
like traditional VPMs do, we apply an active learning-based
framework (HARMLESS) to learn from human inspection
results and to better select which source code files should be
inspected next.
2) Simulations on Mozilla Firefox vulnerability dataset show that,
without any prior knowledge, vulnerability inspections with
HARMLESS can identify most vulnerabilities by inspecting
only a small portion of the codebase.
33) An estimator that can be applied along with the execution of
HARMLESS to estimate the remaining number of vulnerabil-
ities in the codebase. This estimator can be used to provide
guidance to stop the vulnerability inspection when a desired
percentage of vulnerabilities have been found.
4) An error correction mechanism that detects vulnerabilities
that humans failed to detect without imposing excessive extra
human inspection effort.
5) All code and data used in this analysis are available3, allowing
other researchers to replicate, improve, or even refute our
findings.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Some back-
ground and related work is discussed in §2. Our methodology
is described in §3. This is followed by the details on how to
simulate the HARMLESS inspection process on Mozilla Firefox
vulnerability dataset in §4. Details of the experiment (simulation)
designs and answers to the research questions are presented in §5.
Threats to validity and limitations to this work are analyzed in §6
while conclusion and future work are provided in §7.
Before beginning, we digress to comment that in this case
study we do not show that in practice, tools like HARMLESS are
effective in reducing vulnerabilities in real projects. Before we can
ask projects to work with us on such a study, we must first certify
our technique on carefully controlled laboratory problems (hence
this paper).
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Security Vulnerability Prediction and Prioritization
In this subsection, we discuss the existing vulnerability prediction
models (VPMs). These prediction models are used to prioritize
validation and verification efforts. Based on what information is
required and utilized in those approaches, we categorize them into
three groups:
1) Supervised methods, which trains a model on historical inspec-
tion results (known vulnerable files and known non-vulnerable
files) to predict the likelihood of new/changed files containing
vulnerabilities;
2) Semi-supervised methods, which trains a model on historical
inspection results as well as the new/changed (unlabeled)
files to predict the likelihood of new/changed files containing
vulnerabilities;
3) Unsupervised methods, which do not rely on historical in-
spection results, but utilizes other indicators for vulnerability
proneness.
2.1.1 Supervised Methods
Most of the previous work in vulnerability prediction are super-
vised; i.e. they use known vulnerabilities to train a supervised
learning model for predicting unknown vulnerabilities. Focusing
on statistical classifiers on source code artifacts, such as binaries,
files, and functions, these approaches classify code artifacts as
either vulnerable or not vulnerable. Some of the datasets used
in this process include the Windows operating system [7], [8],
the Mozilla Firefox web browser [16], [9], and the RedHat
Enterprise Linux Kernel [16]. The two types of features they use
for predicting vulnerabilities are software metrics and text mining
features:
3. https://github.com/ai-se/Mozilla Firefox Vulnerability Data
Software metrics: Zimmermann et al. [7] reported a median
recall of 20% after using all available source code metrics to build
a Random Forest [17] classifier. Similarly, Chowdhury et al. [18]
report that their vulnerability predictors had low recalls of 23%.
Shin et al. [19], [16], [6] focused on churn and complexity with
a different set of software metrics and achieved a higher recall
of 83%. However, they also reported a precision as low as 5%.
Hovsepyan et al. [20] extracted software metrics from design
churn and achieved 71% precision, but only 27% recall on average.
Text mining features: Scandariato et al. [5] applied text
mining to predict security vulnerabilities. Their hypothesis was
that specific tokens found in source code files may indicate
whether this file is more prone to vulnerabilities; for example,
the presence of “nullptr” might mean a specific source code file
is more prone to vulnerabilities resulting from null references.
In their case studies [5], a static code analysis tool was used to
decide the ground truth labels. Such static code analysis tools have
a notoriously large false positive rate and may incorrectly decide
that many code components are “vulnerable”. Neuhaus et al. [21]
extracted only the imports and calls information from source code
as text mining features to predict vulnerabilities. They reported
that their approach correctly predicted about half of all vulnerable
components, and about two-thirds of all predictions were correct.
Walden et al. [10] compared software metric-based approaches
for vulnerability prediction to text mining approaches and found
that text mining performed better in terms of precision and recall
than software metric approaches. Later in §5, we show the same
trend with HARMLESS that text mining features outperform
software metrics. Walden et al. [10] also reported that cross-
project prediction performances were generally poor—49%, 36%
of the source code files need to be reviewed for finding 66%,
70% of the vulnerabilities, respectively. These results suggest that
training data from the same project are required for these VPMs.
As a result, these supervised VPM methods cannot be used before
the first release since no training data from the same project is
available.
2.1.2 Semi-supervised Methods
Semi-supervised VPMs not only learn from the known vulnerable
and non-vulnerable files, but also extrapolate their conclusions
to files that have not been inspected yet [22], [23], [24], [25].
For example, Meng et al. [26] (a) applied a label propagation
algorithm [22] to assign labels to the unlabeled data; then (b) used
those guesses to train a model for buffer overflow prediction. To
the best of our knowledge, Meng’s work is the only prior work on
vulnerability prediction that used semi-supervised learning. Note
that their work only predicts for one type of security vulnerabilities
(buffer overflow) while in our work, we can target at any type of
vulnerabilities.
2.1.3 Unsupervised Methods
Unsupervised approaches do not rely on human oracles (of which
files contain vulnerabilities) to build the VPM. Instead, they
are fully automatic methods that rely on other indicators of
vulnerability proneness. For example, Gegick et al. [27] trained
a decision tree classifier on non-security failures to rank software
components. They found that, 57% of the vulnerable components
were in the top 9% of the total component ranking, but with a
48% false positive rate. A better result was achieved by Theisen
et al. [28], [8], [29] using crash features extracted from crash
dump stack traces, which are collected after the software’s first
4release. The crash features were used to approximate the attack
surface and predict which parts of the software are more prone
to be vulnerable. Theisen et al. found that crash history is a
strong indicator of vulnerabilities—48.4% of the “crashed” bi-
naries in Windows contain 94.6% of known vulnerabilities [8],
and 15.8% of the “crashed” source code files in Mozilla Firefox
contain 73.6% of known vulnerabilities [29]. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not require the labeling of training data.
However, one major drawback of Theisen et al. approach is that
higher recall cannot be achieved since no information is provided
in those source code files without crash history.
2.2 Active Learning
The methods listed above represent some of the best VPM results
seen to date. While they are all significant research results, there is
much remaining to be done. In this paper, we see if incrementally
adding human insights (via active learning) to supervised/semi-
supervised methods can mitigate any of the shortcomings dis-
cussed in §1.
Fig. 1: Separating positive
(red circles) from negative
(green squares) examples.
The key idea behind active
learning is that a machine learn-
ing algorithm can train faster
(i.e. using less data) if it is al-
lowed to choose the data from
which it learns [30]. To under-
stand active learning, consider
the decision plane between the
positive and negative examples
in Figure 1. Suppose we want to
find more positive examples and
we have access to the Figure 1
model. One tactic for quickly
finding those positive examples
would be to inspect unlabeled data that fall into the red region
of this figure, as far as possible from the green ones (this
tactic is called certainty sampling). Another tactic would be to
better improve the current model by verifying the position of
the boundary; i.e. inspecting unlabeled data that are closest to
the boundary (this tactic is called uncertainty sampling). The
experience from explored total recall problems is that such ac-
tive learners outperform supervised and semi-supervised learners
and can significantly reduce the effort required to achieve high
recall [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41],
[42], [13].
For example, in electronic discovery, attorneys are hired to
review a large number of documents looking for relevant ones
to a certain legal case and provide those as evidence. Cormack
and Grossman [34], [35], [36] designed and applied continues
active learning to save attorneys’ effort from reviewing non-
relevant documents, which further can save a large amount of
the cost of legal cases. Cormack and Grossman also proposed
“knee methods”4 as stopping rule [32] and as a way of efficiently
correcting human errors [31].
Also, in evidence-based medicine, researchers screen titles and
abstracts to determine whether one paper should be included in
a certain systematic review. Wallace et al. [37] designed patient
active learning to help researchers prioritize their effort on papers
to be included. With patient active learning, half of the screening
4. Where performance is monitored until the performance growth curve
“turns a corner”.
effort can be saved while still including most relevant papers [37].
Similarly, Miwa et al. [43] used active learning but with certainty
sampling and weighting to achieve better efficiency. In addition,
Wallace et al. [41] tried to estimate the number of relevant papers
to indicate what recall has been reached during the process.
3 METHODOLOGY
The central insight of this paper is that the vulnerability prediction
problem (finding more vulnerabilities by inspecting less code)
along with the electronic discovery and evidence-based medicine
problems all belong to a class of information retrieval problem
called the total recall problem [12].
3.1 Total Recall
The target of total recall is to optimize the cost for achieving
very high recall (ideally, very close to 100%) with a human
assessor in the loop [12]. It differs from ad hoc information
retrieval where the objective is to identify the best, rather than
all relevant information, and from classification or categorization
where the objective is to separate relevant from non-relevant infor-
mation based on previously labeled training examples [44]. More
specifically, the total recall problem can be described as follows:
Given candidatesE with a small positive fractionR ⊂ E,
each x ∈ E can be inspected to reveal its label as positive
(x ∈ R) or negative (x 6∈ R) at a cost. Starting with
the labeled set L = ∅, the task is to inspect and label
as few candidates as possible (min |L|) while achieving
very high recall in finding positives (max |L ∩R|/|R|).
The Total Recall Problem:
The core problem of vulnerability prediction is how to find most
of the vulnerabilities with least code inspected. Therefore the
vulnerability prediction problem can be generalized as the total
recall problem with:
• E: the entire codebase of a software project.
• R: set of source code files that contain at least one target type
vulnerability.
• L: set of source code files already inspected by humans.
• LR = L ∩ R: set of source code files already inspected by
humans and contain at least one target type vulnerability.
In addition, we believe it is even more appropriate to treat the
vulnerability prediction problem as a total recall problem rather
than a classification problem, given the severe consequences
missing vulnerabilities might have. Therefore we conjecture that
the active learning-based framework for total recall problems can
better address the vulnerability prediction problem. The rest of
this paper checks this conjecture.
3.2 Active learning-based Framework
In practice, active learning-based solutions of total recall problems
focus on the following three targets [41], [32], [31], [13]:
• Target 1 efficiency: achieving higher recall with a lower cost
than other solutions. This is the main target of total recall prob-
lems as defined in §3.1. This target measures the performance of
a total recall solution with the true recall |LR|/|R| in an “ideal”
scenario when every inspected examples are correctly labeled.
• Target 2 stopping rule: stopping at a predetermined recall
rather than an arbitrary stopping point varying from different
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Fig. 2: Block diagram of the active learning-based framework for
total recall problems
projects. Given that the total number of positives |R| is un-
known before all the candidates E are inspected, stopping at a
predetermined recall is especially hard [41]. Stopping too late
would waste inspection effort while stopping too early would
miss potential positives (e.g. vulnerabilities).
• Target 3 human error correction: correcting human errors
efficiently. Given the “human-in-the-loop” nature of the total
recall problems, human errors affect the inspection results a lot.
How to design strategies to efficiently fix such human errors is
also an important problem.
In our previous work [42], we refactored techniques from
Cormack, Wallace, and Miwa et al. [35], [37], [43] and created an
active learning-based framework to solve one specific total recall
problem (identifying relevant papers for literature reviews while
minimizing the number of candidate literature being reviewed by
humans). In that work, an SVM model incrementally learns which
papers are more likely to be “relevant” based on previous decisions
from humans and then guides the humans to read those papers
next. When tested on four datasets, the proposed active learning
framework outperforms the prior state-of-the-art approaches in
terms of Target 1 efficiency [42]. Furthermore, SEMI, an esti-
mator for the total number of relevant papers and DISAGREE, a
technique to efficiently correct human classification errors were
developed as part of the framework for Target 2 stopping rule
and Target 3 human error correction, respectively [13]. When
combined, all these techniques result in a general active learning-
based framework shown in Figure 2 where Step 4 and Step 8 focus
on Target 1 efficiency, Step 7 decides Target 2 stopping rule,
and Step 5 and Step 6 resolve Target 3 human error correction.
The framework helps humans retrieve a target percentage (Trec)
of relevant information (R) with reduced human effort (L) as
follows:
Step 1 Feature Extraction: Given a set of candidates E, extract
features from each candidate. Initialize the set of labeled
data points as L ← ∅ and the set of labeled positive data
points as LR ← ∅.
Step 2 Initial Sampling: Sample without replacement N1 unla-
beled data points to generate a queue Q ⊂ (E \ L) 5.
Step 3 Human Oracle: Seek human oracles for data points in the
queue x ∈ Q: label x as positive or negative after a human
inspects the source code file; add file x into the labeled set
L and remove x from Q; if x is labeled positive, also add
x into set LR. Once the queue is cleared Q = ∅, proceed
to Step 4 if at least one positive data point has been found
(|LR| ≥ 1), otherwise go back to Step 2.
Step 4 Train Model: Train a classifier on the current labeled set
LR and L with features extracted in Step 1 to predict
whether one data point is positive or negative.
Step 5 Error Prediction: Apply the classifier trained in Step 4
to predict on the labeled set L. Select N2 data points with
highest predicted probability to have been wrongly labeled
for double-checking. This step aims at correcting human
errors more efficiently by suggesting which data points are
more likely to have been wrongly labeled.
Step 6 Double check: Each file in the queue from Step 5 is
assigned to different humans for double-checking.
Step 7 Recall Estimation: Estimate the total number of positive
data (output |RE | as an estimation of |R|).
• STOP the process and output LR if |LR| ≥ Trec|RE |
(where Trec represents the user-defined target recall).
• Otherwise proceed to Step 8. This step aims at provid-
ing an accurate estimation of the current recall, so that
the user could choose to stop the process when target
recall Trec is reached.
Step 8 Query Strategy: Apply the classifier trained in Step 4 to
predict on unlabeled set (E \L) and select N data points
as the queue Q, then go to Step 3 to acquire human ora-
cles. This step aims at achieving highest efficiency (higher
recall and lower cost) by utilizing the classifier trained in
Step 4 to suggest which should be reviewed/inspected by
human next.
In the above, N1, N2 are engineering choices. N1 is the batch
size of the process, larger batch size usually leads to fewer times
of training but also worse overall performance. N2 = αN1 where
α ∈ [0, 1] reflects what percentage of the labeled data are double-
checked. Larger N2 means more double checks, which leads to
more human errors covered but also higher cost.
The active learning-based framework differs from the tradi-
tional semi-supervised/supervised learning methods by (1) starting
training very early (with at least 1 positive), (2) always utilizing
the trained model for sampling the data to inspect, and (3) refining
the model with new inspection results. In this way, the active
learning-based framework avoids wasting inspection efforts on
random sampling and utilize the new inspection results to improve
the model and make better predictions.
3.3 HARMLESS
This paper is based on the above general active learning frame-
work, and extends it for vulnerability prediction. When applied to
vulnerability prediction problem, HARMLESS follows the active
learning-based framework shown in Figure 2 and the detailed tech-
niques applied in each step will be presented in this subsection.
3.3.1 Feature Extraction
Features are not restricted in HARMLESS. Any types of features
extracted from the source code can be used to predict vulnera-
5. Let A and B be two sets. The set difference, denoted A \ B consists of
all elements of A except those which are also elements of B.
6bilities in HARMLESS. That said, users could extract their own
features, but here we present three example types of features which
are popular in existing vulnerability researches.
• Software metrics: followed by the work of Shin et al. [16],
SciTools’ Understand6 is used to measure the static features of
software.
• Crash features: followed by the work of Theisen et al. [8], the
crash features measure the number of time each source code file
has crashed. Such information is extracted from the crash dump
stack trace data.
• Text mining features: different from the work of Scandariato
et al. [5], where labels (vulnerable or non-vulnerable) are
required to select tokens, we apply the same text mining feature
extraction as the total recall approaches [42], [13]. Specifically,
we:
1) Tokenized all source code files without stop/control words
removal or stemming.
2) Selected tokens with largest tf-idf score across all source
code files. For token t, its tf-idf score:
Tfidf (t) =
∑
d∈D
Tfidf (t, d),
in which for token t in document d,
Tfidf (t, d) = wtd × (log
|D|∑
d∈D sgn(w
t
d)
+ 1),
wherewti is the number of times token t appears in document
d.
3) Built a term frequency matrix with M tokens selected—
according to our prior work in retrieving relevant pa-
pers [42], [13], we use M = 4000.
4) Normalized each row (feature vector for each file) with their
L2-norm7.
3.3.2 Initial Sampling
Two different sampling strategies are applied in the initial sam-
pling step of HARMLESS:
• Random sampling: random sample without replacement until
the first “vulnerable” file is found.
• Domain knowledge: apply domain knowledge to guide the
initial sampling so that the first “vulnerable” file can be found
earlier. As Theisen et al. [8] suggested, files that have crashed
before are more likely to contain security vulnerabilities. There-
fore HARMLESS selects files by descending order of their crash
feature counts when crash data is available.
3.3.3 Human Oracle
Human inspectors (software engineers) are employed to inspect
the selected source code files. If vulnerabilities are found, the
source code file x containing the vulnerabilities is labeled as
positive and is added into LR.
3.3.4 Train Model
The train model step in HARMLESS includes the following three
procedures:
1) Generate presumptive non-relevant examples to alleviate the
sampling bias in “non-vulnerable” examples (L \ LR).
2) Apply aggressive undersampling to balance the training data.
6. http://www.scitools.com
7. L2-norm for a vector x is
√
xT x, where T denotes “transpose”
3) Train a soft-margin linear support vector machine (SVM) on
the current labeled files LR and L, using features extracted in
Step 1 to predict whether one file is vulnerable or not.
Presumptive non-relevant examples is a technique created
by Cormack and Grossman [34] to alleviate the sampling bias of
negative (non-vulnerable) training data. With certainty sampling,
only the data close to the positive labeled data in feature space are
selected for inspection. As a result, the labeled negative data are
mostly close to the positive data, not spreading all over the feature
space. This sampling bias of negative training data will deteriorate
the performance of the trained model [34]. To alleviate such
sampling bias, each time before training, presumptive non-relevant
examples samples randomly from the unlabeled data (P ⊂ E \L)
and presumes the sampled data to be negative (non-vulnerable) in
training. The rationale behind this technique is that given the low
prevalence of positive (vulnerable) data, it is likely that most of
the presumed ones are negative (non-vulnerable).
Aggressive undersampling is a data balancing technique
first created by Wallace et al. [37]. During the training process,
aggressive undersampling throws away majority (non-vulnerable)
training data (P ∪ L \ LR) closest to SVM decision plane
until reaching the same number of minority (vulnerable) train-
ing data |LR|. Aggressive undersampling is applied only when
|LR| ≥ N3 [42]. Here, N3 is also an engineering choice to avoid
aggressive undersampling reducing the number of training data too
much. Later in §3.3.8 we will show that N3 is also the threshold
where the query strategy is switched from uncertainty sampling
to certainty sampling. Therefore N3 also features the trade-off
between faster building a better model and greedily applying the
model to save inspection effort.
Support vector machines (SVMs) are a well-known and
widely-used classification technique. The idea behind SVMs is
to map input data to a high-dimension feature space and then
construct a linear decision plane in that feature space [45]. Soft-
margin linear SVM [46] is selected as the classifier because it has
been proved to be a useful model in SE text mining [47] and is
applied in the state-of-the-art total recall methods [42], [43], [37],
[35] as well as the state-of-the-art vulnerability prediction meth-
ods [21], [7], [48]. The soft-margin linear SVM is implemented
with the SVC package from scikit-learn8. Default parameters are
applied while kernel is set to be “linear” and penalty is set to
be “balanced” (balancing the penalty of misclassifying a training
data point by the population of its class, i.e. penalize more if
misclassifying a minority class training data point) as suggested
by Miwa et al. [43].
Quasi-Newton Semi-Supervised Support Vector Machine
(QN S3VM) [49], [25] is a semi-supervised algorithm. It makes
perfect sense to apply a semi-supervised learning in Step 4 since
there are a large number of unlabeled data available that are
not utilized by supervised learners like linear SVM. S3VM is
a semi-supervised version of the linear SVM, which makes it a
fair comparison against the linear SVM. In addition, S3VM trains
faster than other semi-supervised learners, e.g. label propagation
as Meng et al. [26] suggested. Given that the inspector needs to
wait for the model to be trained every N1 files inspected, a faster
learner like S3VM is preferred. In our experiments in §5.2, we test
the S3VM learner implemented with the package9 from Gieseke
et al. [49], [25].
8. https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.svm.SVC.html
9. http://www.fabiangieseke.de/index.php/code/qns3vm
73.3.5 Error Prediction
In our prior work [13], an error correction mechanism was de-
signed for correcting both false negatives and false positives. Its
core assumption is:
Human classification errors are more likely to be found
where human and machine classifiers disagree most.
Since the error distribution of the vulnerability inspection process
is different from that of selecting research papers (only false
negatives are considered), it cannot be directly applied to vulner-
ability prediction. As a result, we adopt the same assumption and
designed DISPUTE, which focuses on correcting false negatives
only.
DISPUTE applies the model trained in Step 4 to predict on
the source code files that have only been inspected once and are
labeled as “non-vulnerable” (L\LR). Select N2 files with highest
prediction probability of being vulnerable and add the selected
files into a queue for double-checking.
3.3.6 Double check
Recall from the introduction that when humans inspect a file, they
may fail to find vulnerabilities [11]. Some double checks (where
files are examined by more than one human) are required to cover
such errors. Later in this paper(§5.4), we will test two strategies
for double-checking:
• DISPUTE double-checks each file selected in Step 5 (of
Figure 2) once.
• DISPUTE(3) double-checks each file selected in Step 5 twice
if the first double-checker still finds it to be “non-vulnerable”.
DISPUTE(3) reduces the chance of the selected file being mis-
labeled again at the cost of doubling the double-checking effort.
This strategy is especially useful when the human inspectors have
high chance to miss vulnerable files.
3.3.7 Recall Estimation
In our prior work [13], a semi-supervised estimator called SEMI
is designed for estimating current recall. SEMI utilizes a recur-
sive TemporaryLabel technique. Each time the SVM model is
retrained, SEMI assigns temporary labels to unlabeled examples
and builds a logistic regression model on the temporary labeled
data. It then uses the obtained regression model to predict the
likelihood of being positive of the unlabeled data and updates the
temporary labels. This process is iterated until convergence and
the final temporary labels are used as an estimation of the total
number of positive examples in the dataset. Detailed algorithm of
SEMI is shown in Algorithm 1.
3.3.8 Query Strategy
Query strategy is a key part of active learning. The two query
strategies applied in HARMLESS are: 1) uncertainty sampling,
which picks the unlabeled examples that the active learner is
most uncertain about (examples that are closest to the SVM
decision hyperplane); and 2) certainty sampling, which picks the
unlabeled examples that the active learner is most certain to be
vulnerable (examples on the vulnerable side of and are furthest to
the SVM decision hyperplane). Different researchers endorse dif-
ferent query strategies, e.g. Wallace et al. [37] applies uncertainty
sampling in their patient active learning, Cormack et al. [35], [43]
use certainty sampling from beginning to end. Followed by our
previous design for literature review [13], HARMLESS applies
uncertainty sampling early on and certainty sampling afterward.
Algorithm 1: Psuedo Code for SEMI [13]
Input : E, set of all candidates
L, set of labeled data
LR, set of labeled positive data
CL, classifier trained in Step 4
Output : |RE |, estimated number of positive data
1 Function SEMI (CL,E,L, LR)
2 |RE |last ← 0;
3 ¬L← E \ L;
4 foreach x ∈ E do
5 D(x)← CL.decision function(x);
6 if x ∈ |LR| then
7 Y (x)← 1;
8 else
9 Y (x)← 0;
10 |RE | ←
∑
x∈E
Y (x);
11 while |RE | 6= |RE |last do
// Fit and transform Logistic Regression
12 LReg ← LogisticRegression(D,Y );
13 Y ← TemporaryLabel(LReg,¬L, Y );
14 |RE |last ← |RE |;
// Estimation based on temporary labels
15 |RE | ←
∑
x∈E
Y (x);
16 return |RE |;
17 Function TemporaryLabel (LReg,¬L, Y )
18 count← 0;
19 target← 1;
20 can← ∅;
// Sort ¬L by descending order of LReg(x)
21 ¬L← SortBy(¬L,LReg);
22 foreach x ∈ ¬L do
23 count← count+ LReg(x);
24 can← can ∪ {x};
25 if count ≥ target then
26 Y (can[0])← 1;
27 target← target+ 1;
28 can← ∅;
29 return Y ;
More specifically, Step 8 (of Figure 2) applies the model
trained in Step 4 to predict on unlabeled files (E \ L) and
• select top N1 files with vulnerability prediction probability
closest to 0.5 (uncertainty sampling) if |LR| < N3; or
• select top N1 files with vulnerability prediction probability
closest to 1.0 (certainty sampling) if |LR| ≥ N3.
Push the selected files into the queue Q, then go to Step 3 for
another round of inspection.
3.3.9 Summary
A simple demonstration of the HARMLESS inspection process
is shown in Figure 3. In this figure, HARMLESS incrementally
updates its model and uses it to guide the human inspector to only
inspect the most informative files:
• The demo is progressive, i.e., from top left, we see the start
of the process. In those initial plots, every item is a file. The
subsequent plots show how HARMLESS guides the human
inspector to reveal vulnerabilities.
• Any item with a solid color represents a file where humans have
inspected.
• The hollow green items in Figure 3 are files that HARMLESS
suggests the human to inspect. For example, these hollow green
items appear in (b), (g). Subsequently, in (c), (h) we see the
labels offered by humans (see the blue and red solid items).
8(a) Step 1: initialize each data points
with 2 dimensionality features ex-
tracted from the source code of each
file.
(b) Step 2: random sample N1 =
2 data points (in hollow green) for
human oracles.
(c) Step 3: human inspects the se-
lected N1 = 2 points and la-
bels them as negative (blue). Since
|LR| < 1, return to Step 2.
(d) Step 2: random sample N1 =
2 data points (in hollow green) for
human oracles.
(e) Step 3: human inspects the se-
lected N1 = 2 points and labels
them as positive (red) and negative
(blue). Since |LR| ≥ 1, proceed to
Step 4.
(f) Step 4: since |LR| < N3 = 2,
train a linear SVM model with bal-
anced weights and presumptive neg-
ative examples (hollow blue Xs). The
SVM decision plane is shown as the
black line.
(g) Step 5: apply the SVM model for
error prediction, select N2 = 1 data
point (in hollow green) with highest
prediction probability to be positive
for double-checking.
(h) Step 6: human double-checks the
selected N2 = 1 data point and
labels it as negative (blue). Step 7:
when converges, SEMI temporarily
labels 5 data points as positive (hol-
low red), so |RE | = 5 + |LR| = 6.
Since |LR| < Trec|RE | = 4.8,
proceed to Step 8.
(i) Step 8: since |LR| < N3 = 2,
apply uncertainty sampling to select
N1 = 2 points (in hollow green)
closest to the SVM decision plane for
human oracles.
(j) Step 3: human inspects the se-
lected N1 = 2 points and labels
them as positive (red) and negative
(blue). This time, human wrongly
labels one data point.
(k) Step 4: since |LR| ≥ N3 = 2,
train a linear SVM model with pre-
sumptive negative examples (hollow
blue Xs) and aggressive undersam-
pling (keep |LR| = 2 negatives).
(l) Step 5: apply the SVM model for
error prediction, select N2 = 1 data
point (in hollow green) with highest
prediction probability to be positive
for double-checking.
(m) Step 6: human double-checks
the selected N2 = 1 data point and
label it as positive (red). This time,
false negative is corrected.
(n) Step 7: when converges, SEMI
temporarily labels 4 data points as
positive (hollow red), so |RE | =
4 + |LR| = 7. Since |LR| <
Trec|RE | = 5.6, proceed to Step
8.
(o) Step 8: since |LR| ≥ N3 = 2,
apply certainty sampling to select
N1 = 2 points (in hollow green)
with highest prediction probability to
be positive for human oracles.
(p) Iterate for 7 more rounds, un-
til Step 7: when converges, SEMI
temporarily labels 1 data points as
positive (hollow red), so |RE | =
1 + |LR| = 5. Since |LR| ≥
Trec|RE | = 4, stop and output the
|LR| = 4 points (in red).
Fig. 3: Consider |E| = 50 source code files in a software project. If human inspects all the files correctly, they will find |R| = 5 files
(Os) being positive (vulnerable) and |E \ R| = 45 files (Xs) being negative (vulnerability-free). In this demo, HARMLESS guides
humans to inspect 20 (40%) source code files and find 4 (80%) of the vulnerable files. Data points colored in gray are unlabeled E \L,
while data points colored in red are labeled as positive LR and data points colored in blue are labeled as negative L\LR. As for the
hollow ones, green are the data points selected for inspections/double checks while red / blue are the data points temporarily labeled
as positive/negative by SEMI/presumptive negative examples. Black lines are the decision hyper-planes of the linear SVM model.
9• The solid diagonal lines show updates to the decision hyper-
plane of the SVM model. Note that this line first appears in (f)
and is then updated in (k) and (p).
In the demo, for simplicity, parameters are set to N1 = 2, N2 =
1, N3 = 2 and the feature dimensionality is set to be 2, i.e. each
data point (source code file) is represented by 2 features. Target
recall is set to be Trec = 0.8 and positive data points can be
sometimes mislabeled as negative to demonstrate human errors.
4 MOZILLA FIREFOX CASE STUDY
While §3 shows how HARMLESS should be applied in practice
with humans inspecting codes, it is too expensive for human
inspectors to test different treatments and answer all the research
questions. As a result, the performance of HARMLESS is tested
through simulations on the Mozilla Firefox vulnerability dataset.
4.1 Dependent Variables
The Mozilla Firefox dataset focuses on C and C++ files in Mozilla
Firefox. Metrics were collected for 28,750 unique source code
files in the project, within which 135 vulnerabilities affecting 271
files are manually labeled as the ground truth. These ground truth
vulnerabilities were manually collected from Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories blog [14] and bug reports from Bugzilla10 up
to November 21st, 2017. As for Mozilla Foundation Security Ad-
visories blog, vulnerability type and source code file(s) modified
to fix the vulnerability were recorded. From this source, 247 files
are found to contain vulnerabilities. Mozilla’s bug database was
then mined for bugs that were not reported publicly on the blog
as vulnerabilities. Two human raters individually read through
each bug report and classified each as “vulnerability” or “not a
vulnerability”. The two raters looked at the description of each
bug, along with the comment history and the diffs describing
the fix for the vulnerability to determine a classification. This
resulted in 111 files involved with vulnerabilities. The inter-rater
reliability between the two raters when classifying vulnerable files
was κ = 0.6. These 111 files were then added to the 247 files
found on the Mozilla Security Advisories blog, resulting in a final
list of 358 source code files that were involved with vulnerabilities.
Fourteen source code files were discarded and 8 source code files
were changed based on the movement of code to another source
code file or the removal of code from the system. Finally, a list of
271 unique files remained with at least one vulnerability.
After identifying the vulnerabilities for inclusion in the dataset,
two humans then classify each vulnerability using an existing
vulnerability classification scheme—the Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE) set of most commonly seen weaknesses in
software11. After classifying each vulnerability, the humans then
convene and resolve any differences that have occurred between
the two of them. If they could not come to a consensus, a third
party arbitrator was used to resolve the conflict.
After this classification, the Mozilla Firefox dataset contains
14 different types of vulnerabilities and some files are associated
with multiple types of vulnerabilities. To simulate vulnerability
inspections targeting specific types of vulnerabilities, we grouped
the vulnerabilities into five categories to ensure that each category
contains enough data (#Vulnerable Files) for a simulation, as
shown in Table 1. In the following sections §5, we show results
10. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/
11. http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1003.html
on simulations targeting each vulnerability category with file-level
granularity. For example, when targeting “Protection Mechanism
Failure”, only the 119 files associated with this category are
considered vulnerable.
4.2 Independent Variables
Here we briefly describe the three types of features extracted
from the Mozilla Firefox vulnerability dataset and used in our
simulations.
4.2.1 Software Metrics
SciTools’ Understand12 was used to measure the metrics from the
Mozilla Firefox source code files. The list of the software metrics
provided by the dataset is shown below:
• CountClassBase - Number of subclasses in a file.
• CountClassCoupled - Coupling of the classes in a file.
• CountClassDerived - Number of subclasses derived from
classes originating in a file.
• CountDeclInstanceVariablePrivate - Number of private vari-
ables declared in a file.
• CountDeclMethod - Number of methods declared in a file.
• CountInput - Number of incoming calls to the source code file.
• CountOutput - Number of outgoing calls from the source code
file.
• Cyclomatic - Cyclomatic Complexity of a file.
• CountLine - Number of lines of code (excluding comments and
whitespace) in a file.
• MaxInheritanceTree - The size of the maximum leaf in the
inheritance tree leading from a file.
Some metrics in Shin et al. [16] are not covered due to the follow-
ing reasons: (1) metrics that no public tool (to our knowledge)
provides an equivalent to, e.g. incoming closure and outgoing
closure; (2) metrics that do not apply to the Mozilla Firefox
project, e.g. organization intersection factor; (3) metrics that are
identical to some already covered ones in Mozilla Firefox project,
e.g. edit frequency.
4.2.2 Text Mining Features
As described in §3.3.1, text mining features were extracted by
tokenizing the source code files, selecting top 4000 tokens based
on tf-idf score, and then applying L2 normalization on files.
4.2.3 Crash Features
Crash dump stack trace data was collected from Mozilla Crash
Reports13. We collected crashes from January 2017 to November
2017, with a total of 1,141,519 crashes collected. For each crash,
the field marked “crashing thread” is observed and each file that
appeared in the thread is added to the dataset. We also kept
track of how many times a file was observed in different crashes
since files that crash more often have a higher chance to contain
vulnerabilities.
4.3 Simulation on Mozilla Firefox Dataset
Code inspection with HARMLESS, as described in §3, is simu-
lated on the Mozilla Firefox dataset with the following settings:
Step 1 Feature Extraction: E is the set of all 28,750 source
code files, R is the set of source code files containing the target
12. http://www.scitools.com
13. https://crash-stats.mozilla.com/home/product/Firefox
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for vulnerabilities types grouping
Vulnerability Type #Vulnerable Files Containing Types
Protection Mechanism Failure 119 protection mechanism failure.
Resource Management Errors 85 uncontrolled resource consumption, improper resource shutdown or release,resource management errors, use after free, resource leak.
Data Processing Errors 35 data processing errors.
Code Quality 29 code quality.
Other 32 race conditions, configuration, environment, traversal, link-following, other.
All 271 All 14 types of vulnerabilities.
The Mozilla Firefox dataset contains 14 different types of vulnerabilities and some files are associated with multiple types of
vulnerabilities. To simulate security reviews targeting specific types of vulnerabilities, we group the vulnerabilities into five categories
to ensure that each category contains enough data (#Vulnerable Files) for a simulation. Column #Vulnerable Files reports the number
of unique files containing the specific type of vulnerabilities. Files containing multiple vulnerabilities still count for 1 but can contribute
to multiple groups.
TABLE 2: Experiments design
Target research questions Human error rate ER in Step 3 Use of Step 5 and Step 6? Recall estimation |RE | in Step 7
Target 1 efficiency RQ1 ER = 0 no |RE | = |R|
Target 2 stopping rule RQ2 ER = 0 no
|RE | is estimated by SEMI
as described in §3.3.7
Target 3 human error
correction RQ3, RQ4 ER ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} yes
|RE | is estimated by SEMI
as described in §3.3.7
type of vulnerabilities shown in Table 1, L ← ∅ is the set of
labeled files, and LR ← ∅ is the set of labeled target vulnerable
files. Extract features from each source code file in E.
Step 2 Initial Sampling: The batch size is chosen as N1 =
100. We use N1 = 100 during our simulations to speed up the
simulation process. However, it is suggested to use a smaller
batch size, e.g. N1 = 10, in practice since the cost of training a
model more often is usually much less than the cost of inspecting
more code.
Step 3 Human Oracle: Rather than asking human inspectors to
inspect source code files, as specified in §3.3.3, the ground truth
labels from Mozilla Firefox dataset are applied to simulate the
inspection. Each vulnerable file x ∈ Q ∩ R has ER chance
of being wrongly labeled as “non-vulnerable” and 1 − ER
chance of being correctly labeled as “vulnerable”. Every non-
vulnerable file x ∈ Q \ R will be labeled as “non-vulnerable”.
Here ER = 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50% simulates the probability of a
human expert failing to detect the vulnerabilities (false negative
rate).
Step 5 Error Prediction: Half of the inspected files are selected
for double checks (N2 = 0.5N1) based on the DISPUTE
principle. We show later in §5 that by double-checking half of
the labeled files, most (96%) of the human false negatives can be
covered.
Step 8 Query Strategy: Uncertainty sampling if |LR| < N3 =
10; certainty sampling when |LR| ≥ N3 = 10.
Here, N1, N2, N3 are selected based on our experience in solving
other total recall problems [42], [13].
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section describes experiments assessing HARMLESS’s per-
formance. All the following experiments are simulated on the
Mozilla Firefox case study, as described in §4 and are used to
answer the research questions listed in §1.
5.1 Performance Metrics
HARMLESS’s task is to optimize the inspection effort for achiev-
ing very high recall. Therefore HARMLESS focuses on minimal
cost, maximal recall, defined as follows:
recall =
# of vulnerable files found
# of vulnerable files exist
=
|LR|
|R| . (1)
cost =
# of source code files reviewed
# of source code files exist
=
|L|
|E| . (2)
Since our simulations are in file level granularity, the numerator of
cost in (2) counts the number of times the source code files being
reviewed, i.e. it still increases when the same file is reviewed for a
second time by a different reviewer. Using these two metrics, one
treatment is considered better than another if it reaches the same
target recall with a lower cost.
Beside recall and cost, we use the Estimation vs Cost curve to
assess the accuracy for estimating the total number of vulnerable
files in Step 7, Figure 2:
estimation =
# of vulnerable files estimated
# of vulnerable files exist
=
|RE |
|R| . (3)
The sooner this estimation converges to 1.0, the better the esti-
mator is. As described in Step 7, the inspection process will stop
when
|LR| ≥ Trec|RE |,
where Trec represents the target recall. The closer the inspection
stops to the target recall, the better the stopping rule.
As shown in Table 2, three experiments are designed to answer
the research questions listed in §1 and evaluate HARMLESS
based on the three targets described in §3.2. More details on each
experiment’s design and its corresponding result are presented in
the rest of this section.
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TABLE 3: Treatments for Target 1 Efficiency
Learn From
Treatment Learner softwaremetrics
text mining
features
crash
features
human
oracle
Metrics SVM
Text SVM
Hybrid SVM
S3VM S3VM
Crash n/a
Random n/a
5.2 Target 1 Efficiency
5.2.1 Simulation Design
Cost for reaching different levels of recall is used to assess the
vulnerability inspection efficiency of HARMLESS. As a result,
stopping rule and human errors are not considered, i.e. human
error rate ER in Step 3 is set to be 0, Step 5 and Step 6 are
disabled, and in Step 7, real recall is used for the stopping rule
|RE | = |R|, as shown in Table 2.
We first need to decide (1) what feature in Step 1 serves
best for predicting vulnerabilities in the active learning-based
framework, and (2) what type of learner (supervised, unsuper-
vised, semi-supervised) in Step 4 performs best inside the active
learning-based framework. As a result, we first test the following
feature types with supervised learner (linear SVM as described in
§3.3.1) to find the best feature set:
• Metrics: a linear SVM trained on file level software metrics
features (described in §4.2.1) which quantifies different types of
software complexity and are collected from the source code.
• Text: a linear SVM trained on file level text mining features
(described in §4.2.2) which treats the source code as raw text
and performs standard text mining feature extraction (term
frequency with L2 normalization [42]) on it.
• Hybrid: a linear SVM trained on the combination of text mining
features and crash features (described in §4.2.3). This feature set
is built by adding one column (number of times the source code
file has crashed) to the term frequency matrix of the text mining
features set before normalization. In Step 2, crash counts are
applied as domain knowledge to first sample files which have
crashed most frequently.
Then we test the following semi-supervised and unsupervised
learners within the active learning-based framework:
• S3VM: a linear kernel QN S3VM trained on file level text
mining features, similar to Text except that it utilizes unlabeled
data in training to build its model.
• Crash: an unsupervised approach where no model is trained and
source code files are selected in descending order of the number
of times they crashed [28] (described in §4.2.3). Note that this
unsupervised approach does not require the active learning-
based framework of HARMLESS.
As a baseline, the simulation also includes the following treatment:
• Random: a baseline approach where source code files are
inspected in random order. This treatment serves as a baseline
where code inspection is performed without any help from
HARMLESS.
Summaries of the treatments are provided in Table 3. HARMLESS
framework includes all the treatments learned from human oracles.
5.2.2 Experimental Result
RQ1: Can human inspection effort be saved by applying
HARMLESS to find a certain percentage of vulnerabilities?
Table 4 shows the cost to reach different levels of recall. One
method is considered better than another if it costs less to reach
the same recall. Based on these results, we make the following
observations:
• Metrics, Text, Hybrid, and S3VM all perform better than
Random, indicating the effectiveness of the proposed active
learning framework in HARMLESS.
• Crash performs well in the early stages (when recall<80%)
but is unable to achieve certain target recall values (see the
numerous “n/a” entries of Table 4). For vulnerabilities of type
“Code Quality”, Crash performs better than any other approach.
Overall, this unsupervised approach has limitations compared to
active learning-based approaches.
• Targeting different types of vulnerabilities does not affect much
of the performance of HARMLESS with active learning.
Therefore active learning-based HARMLESS approach is recom-
mended to reliably achieve high recall with low cost. Among the
active learning-based approaches:
• Software metrics features (Metrics) perform the worst—they
always cost more to reach the same recall. Therefore we do not
recommend using static software metrics as features to predict
vulnerabilities in HARMLESS.
• When crash features are unavailable, e.g. before a software’s
first release, Text performs the best.
• When crash features are available, Hybrid utilizes both Text
and Crash and performs slightly better than Text in terms of
median performances and greatly reduces the variance.
• A semi-supervised learner with text mining features (S3VM)
performs worse than its supervised counterpart (Text), espe-
cially in the early stages when training data is few. Therefore
semi-supervised learners are not recommended inside the active
learning-based framework.
• These results also show that the human effort required is still
high even with the help of HARMLESS, e.g. to identify 271
× 0.95 = 257 vulnerable files, 28,750 × 0.2 = 5,750 files need
to be inspected by humans. While this means 28,750 - 5,750 =
23,000 fewer files to be inspected compared to inspecting all the
files, it is still a tedious and frustrating task (one vulnerable file
may be found within every 22 files inspected).
Summing up this work on RQ1, we say:
Yes. Simulated on Mozilla Firefox dataset, applying
HARMLESS with linear SVM trained on text mining fea-
tures, 60, 70, 80, 90, 95, 99% of the target vulnerabilities
can be found by inspecting only 6, 8, 10, 16, 20, 34%
of the source code files, respectively. If available, crash
features can further boost the inspection efficiency when
applied to guide the inspection order in the early stage.
RQ1: Can human inspection effort be saved by applying
HARMLESS to find a certain percentage of vulnerabili-
ties?
5.3 Target 2 Stopping Rule
5.3.1 Simulation Design
In this experiment, the SEMI estimator (described in §3.3.7), is
applied to estimate the number of vulnerabilities when running
HARMLESS with the best feature set picked from RQ1. The
estimation from SEMI is then used as an indicator of whether
the target recall has been reached and thus the inspection can be
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TABLE 4: Experimental Results for Target 1 Efficiency
Target recall
60 70 80 85 90 95 99 100
Vulnerability Type Cost to reach target recall
Metrics
Protection Mechanism Failure 50 ( 7 ) 56 ( 6 ) 60 ( 8 ) 63 ( 8 ) 67 ( 8 ) 79 ( 7 ) 94 ( 3 ) 99 ( 2 )
Resource Management Errors 49 (25) 57 (15) 63 ( 13 ) 67 ( 12 ) 71 ( 10 ) 75 ( 9 ) 99 ( 0 ) 99 ( 0 )
Data Processing Errors 35 ( 4 ) 41 ( 8 ) 45 ( 9 ) 61 ( 23 ) 70 ( 24 ) 78 ( 9 ) 82 ( 5 ) 82 ( 5 )
Code Quality 38 ( 6 ) 42 (20) 61 ( 19 ) 61 ( 18 ) 64 ( 12 ) 66 ( 9 ) 72 ( 3 ) 72 ( 3 )
Other 38 (19) 45 (17) 58 ( 7 ) 60 ( 6 ) 64 ( 8 ) 70 ( 10 ) 92 ( 12 ) 92 ( 12 )
All 49 (17) 53 ( 7 ) 60 ( 4 ) 63 ( 4 ) 66 ( 3 ) 72 ( 3 ) 94 ( 6 ) 99 ( 0 )
Median 42 (18) 50 (17) 59 ( 12 ) 62 ( 10 ) 67 ( 8 ) 74 ( 10 ) 91 ( 15 ) 94 ( 19 )
Text
Protection Mechanism Failure 6 ( 1 ) 9 ( 2 ) 12 ( 1 ) 16 ( 1 ) 20 ( 3 ) 28 ( 3 ) 37 ( 9 ) 43 ( 7 )
Resource Management Errors 6 ( 1 ) 8 ( 2 ) 9 ( 1 ) 9 ( 2 ) 11 ( 3 ) 13 ( 2 ) 33 ( 4 ) 33 ( 4 )
Data Processing Errors 12 ( 4 ) 13 ( 2 ) 14 ( 4 ) 15 ( 4 ) 16 ( 4 ) 20 ( 4 ) 42 ( 15 ) 42 ( 15 )
Code Quality 4 ( 4 ) 5 ( 4 ) 8 ( 3 ) 10 ( 4 ) 19 ( 5 ) 21 ( 5 ) 30 ( 7 ) 30 ( 7 )
Other 5 ( 3 ) 6 ( 4 ) 11 ( 5 ) 12 ( 5 ) 14 ( 4 ) 18 ( 3 ) 33 ( 2 ) 83 ( 2 )
All 5 ( 0 ) 7 ( 0 ) 9 ( 1 ) 12 ( 1 ) 14 ( 1 ) 20 ( 2 ) 34 ( 2 ) 85 ( 0 )
Median 6 ( 2 ) 8 ( 3 ) 10 ( 4 ) 13 ( 4 ) 16 ( 5 ) 20 ( 7 ) 34 ( 7 ) 43 ( 49 )
Hybrid
Protection Mechanism Failure 7 ( 0 ) 9 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 ) 14 ( 0 ) 16 ( 1 ) 21 ( 3 ) 58 ( 1 ) 59 ( 1 )
Resource Management Errors 5 ( 0 ) 7 ( 0 ) 8 ( 0 ) 9 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) 13 ( 2 ) 39 ( 0 ) 39 ( 0 )
Data Processing Errors 7 ( 0 ) 10 ( 0 ) 15 ( 0 ) 15 ( 0 ) 16 ( 0 ) 29 ( 2 ) 37 ( 3 ) 37 ( 3 )
Code Quality 3 ( 1 ) 4 ( 1 ) 4 ( 2 ) 5 ( 1 ) 10 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 ) 16 ( 1 ) 16 ( 1 )
Other 4 ( 0 ) 9 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 ) 14 ( 0 ) 14 ( 0 ) 37 ( 9 ) 61 ( 14 )
All 6 ( 0 ) 8 ( 0 ) 10 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) 14 ( 0 ) 18 ( 2 ) 36 ( 0 ) 59 ( 0 )
Median 6 ( 2 ) 8 ( 1 ) 10 ( 4 ) 12 ( 5 ) 14 ( 4 ) 17 ( 7 ) 37 ( 5 ) 41 ( 22 )
S3VM
Protection Mechanism Failure 20 (44) 22 (43) 25 ( 45 ) 28 ( 41 ) 33 ( 37 ) 52 ( 23 ) 62 ( 16 ) 70 ( 15 )
Resource Management Errors 21 (22) 23 (21) 24 ( 22 ) 25 ( 21 ) 30 ( 20 ) 32 ( 18 ) 51 ( 8 ) 51 ( 8 )
Data Processing Error 25 (37) 26 (38) 28 ( 40 ) 29 ( 39 ) 32 ( 36 ) 37 ( 29 ) 43 ( 28 ) 43 ( 28 )
Code Quality 29 (20) 29 (19) 30 ( 19 ) 30 ( 19 ) 35 ( 26 ) 41 ( 23 ) 53 ( 21 ) 53 ( 21 )
Other 28 (20) 29 (21) 30 ( 19 ) 32 ( 17 ) 33 ( 17 ) 36 ( 17 ) 53 ( 40 ) 53 ( 40 )
All 20 ( 8 ) 21 ( 8 ) 25 ( 7 ) 27 ( 7 ) 31 ( 5 ) 41 ( 5 ) 64 ( 10 ) 80 ( 7 )
Median 23 (24) 25 (23) 27 ( 22 ) 29 ( 20 ) 32 ( 22 ) 40 ( 23 ) 56 ( 27 ) 60 ( 35 )
Crash
Protection Mechanism Failure 5 ( 0 ) 8 ( 0 ) 13 ( 0 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Resource Management Errors 4 ( 0 ) 5 ( 0 ) 8 ( 0 ) 10 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) n/a n/a n/a
Data Processing Errors 8 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Code Quality 1 ( 0 ) 2 ( 0 ) 4 ( 0 ) 4 ( 0 ) 10 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 )
Other 6 ( 0 ) 9 ( 0 ) 12 ( 0 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
All 5 ( 0 ) 8 ( 0 ) 11 ( 0 ) 14 ( 0 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Median 5 ( 1 ) 8 ( 3 ) 11 ( 4 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Random
Protection Mechanism Failure 59 ( 7 ) 70 ( 4 ) 80 ( 4 ) 85 ( 3 ) 90 ( 2 ) 95 ( 2 ) 98 ( 1 ) 99 ( 0 )
Resource Management Errors 59 ( 4 ) 69 ( 5 ) 77 ( 5 ) 84 ( 4 ) 88 ( 3 ) 94 ( 2 ) 99 ( 1 ) 99 ( 1 )
Data Processing Errors 57 (12) 70 (11) 78 ( 10 ) 84 ( 9 ) 86 ( 10 ) 94 ( 5 ) 97 ( 3 ) 97 ( 3 )
Code Quality 58 ( 8 ) 70 (10) 77 ( 11 ) 82 ( 8 ) 90 ( 9 ) 94 ( 6 ) 98 ( 2 ) 98 ( 2 )
Other 59 ( 5 ) 67 ( 5 ) 78 ( 6 ) 83 ( 5 ) 88 ( 6 ) 93 ( 5 ) 97 ( 2 ) 97 ( 2 )
All 59 ( 3 ) 69 ( 3 ) 79 ( 3 ) 84 ( 2 ) 89 ( 2 ) 94 ( 1 ) 98 ( 0 ) 99 ( 0 )
Median 59 ( 6 ) 69 ( 6 ) 79 ( 5 ) 83 ( 5 ) 89 ( 4 ) 94 ( 3 ) 98 ( 1 ) 98 ( 2 )
This table shows the cost (i.e. percent code reviewed) required to reach different levels of recall. Medians and IQRs (75th-25th percentile)
are shown for 30 repeated simulations (IQR results are shown in brackets). Crash has many empty cells since it provides no information
on vulnerabilities located in the files that have never crashed. In this table, lower median values are better so all the Random results
are worse than anything else (as might be expected). Of the remaining results, Text and Hybrid perform better than Metrics. Important
note: this table does not consider how to stop at the target recall, it only shows the cost when first reaching that recall. For experiments
considering stopping rules, see Table 5.
safely stopped. This experiment is designed to test the accuracy of
the SEMI estimations and whether the inspections can stop close
to the target recall. Uniform random sampling is applied as a
baseline estimation. Uniform random sampling samples from
unlabeled data randomly and queries the labels, then estimates
|R| as |RE | = |E| × |LR|/|L|. It was believed to be the most
accurate estimation method before the introduction of SEMI [41].
Human errors are considered in the next experiment so, for
this experiment, the human error rate ER in Step 3 is set to be 0,
and Step 5 and Step 6 are disabled, as shown in Table 2.
5.3.2 Experimental Result
RQ2: Can HARMLESS correctly stop the vulnerability in-
spection when a predetermined percentage of vulnerabilities
has been found? To answer this research question, we first show
the accuracy of the estimations from SEMI by presenting the
Estimation vs Cost curve in Figure 4. In these plots, estimations,
calculated as Equation (3), are considered accurate and useful if
they converge to estimation=1.0 (denoted as the “true” line) early
(when cost is small). According to Figure 4, the estimations from
SEMI using either Hybrid or Text feature converge to 1.0 earlier
than Uniform random sampling on every target vulnerability
types. Usually the estimation error of SEMI becomes ≤ 5% after
cost ≥ 0.3.
Table 5 shows results using the SEMI stopping rule. In most
cases, the SEMI estimator slightly over-estimates (|RE | > |R|) to
ensure the target recall is reached. Also, the higher the target recall,
the more effective the stopping rule (i.e. estimation becomes more
accurate when cost increases). Further, the stopping rule works
better with Text, where the inspection usually stops with less
than 6% error from target recall. Finally, Hybrid over-estimates
(|RE | > |R|) too much on “Code Quality” and under-estimates
(|RE | < |R|) on “All”. Overall, when using SEMI, Text is better.
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Fig. 4: Estimation vs Cost curves. Estimations (calculated as Equation (3)) are considered accurate and useful if they converge to
estimation=1.0 early (when cost is small). Solid lines represent the median estimations from 30 simulations while dashed lines show
the 75th to 25th percentile range. In this figure, estimation=1.0 is denoted as the “true” line. When an estimation converges to this line,
it means that the estimated number of vulnerabilities are equal to the true number. Also, when cost reaches 1.0, all source code files
have been reviewed. For example, the estimations from Text and Hybrid on the entire project converge to 1.0 when cost is about 0.25,
thus providing accurate estimation on whether the target recall has reached for cost ≥ 0.25.
TABLE 5: Experiment Results for Target 2 Stopping Rule
target recall
90 95 99
Vulnerability Type Recall Cost Recall Cost Recall Cost
Te
xt
Protection Mechanism
Failure 87 ( 2 ) 18 ( 2 ) 91 (2) 22 ( 3 ) 98 (3) 33 ( 5 )
Resource Management
Errors 96 ( 0 ) 19 ( 2 ) 98 (1) 26 ( 3 ) 100 (0) 46 ( 3 )
Data Processing Errors 96 ( 2 ) 36 ( 5 ) 100 (3) 46 ( 5 ) 100 (0) 56 ( 6 )
Code Quality 96 ( 3 ) 30 ( 7 ) 100 (0) 42 ( 6 ) 100 (0) 54 ( 7 )
Other 97 ( 0 ) 25 ( 6 ) 97 (0) 32 ( 6 ) 97 (0) 50 ( 5 )
All 90 ( 2 ) 15 ( 2 ) 95 (1) 21 ( 1 ) 99 (0) 43 ( 0 )
Median 96 ( 6 ) 23 (12) 97 (4) 30 (17) 99 (2) 47 (10)
H
yb
ri
d
Protection Mechanism
Failure 84 (19) 14 ( 7 ) 94 (2) 20 ( 6 ) 98 (1) 44 (12)
Resource Management
Errors 93 ( 1 ) 12 ( 0 ) 98 (1) 17 ( 1 ) 100 (0) 48 ( 0 )
Data Processing Errors 96 ( 3 ) 31 ( 3 ) 100 (0) 45 ( 2 ) 100 (0) 58 ( 2 )
Code Quality 100 ( 0 ) 27 ( 0 ) 100 (0) 38 ( 0 ) 100 (0) 58 ( 1 )
Other 95 ( 0 ) 20 ( 0 ) 95 (0) 28 ( 1 ) 97 (0) 52 ( 3 )
All 67 ( 2 ) 8 ( 0 ) 70 (2) 8 ( 0 ) 99 (0) 46 ( 0 )
Median 93 (11) 20 (14) 96 (5) 27 (21) 100 (1) 50 (10)
This table shows the actual achieved recalls and cost when using the
SEMI estimator to stop at target recall. Same as in Table 4, numbers
in brackets denote IQR values (75th-25th percentile ranges) and the
other numbers are median values across 30 repeated simulations.
Yes. Through accurate estimation of the number of vul-
nerabilities, HARMLESS can stop the inspection process
close to the target recall. We recommend using text min-
ing features and setting the target recall as high as 95% or
99% to guarantee the detection of most vulnerabilities.
RQ2: Can HARMLESS correctly stop the vulnerability
inspection when a predetermined percentage of vulnera-
bilities has been found?
The above results also suggest that it is very important to
further improve the estimation since a tiny reduction in its error
can lead to the saving of a large amount of effort. For example,
when targeting 95% recall, the inspection stopped at 97% recall
with 30% cost, which means 97% of the vulnerable files can be
identified by inspecting 8,625 source code files. Compared to the
result of RQ1, about 3,000 more files need to be inspected due to
the small estimation error (2%) of HARMLESS.
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5.4 Target 3 Human Error Correction
5.4.1 Simulation Design
Hatton [11]’s report suggested that each “vulnerable” file has in
average 47% chance of being mislabeled as “non-vulnerable”
while “non-vulnerable” files can never be mislabeled as “vul-
nerable”. Following this report, we simulate how vulnerability
inspection would be affected by randomly injecting human errors:
• No false positives: “non-vulnerable” files can never be misla-
beled as “vulnerable”.
• False negative rate ER: each “vulnerable” file has the same
chance of being mislabeled as “non-vulnerable”.
Our simulations explore five ways to handle human er-
rors while injecting false negatives at the rate of ER =
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50%):
• None: No error correction. This will be our baseline result.
• Two-persons [11] check each label. In Step 3, if one file is
labeled as “non-vulnerable” and has been reviewed by only one
reviewer, it goes back into the queue to wait for a different
reviewer to double-check it.
• Cormack’17 [31]: This is an advanced error correction method
for citation screening. We reproduce half of Cormack’17 to cor-
rect false negatives only and incorporate it into the distributed
framework: In Step 8, Cormack’17 utilizes a different stopping
rule. This method detects the inflection point14 i of the current
recall curve, and compare the slopes before and after i. If
slope<i/slope>i is greater than a specific threshold ρ = 6, the
review should be stopped. For details about this stopping rule,
please refer to Cormack and Grossman [32]. After the stopping
rule is satisfied in Step 8, send all files reviewed before the
inflection point i and labeled as “non-vulnerable” to the queue.
The security review and test stops after all the files in the queue
have been reviewed by a different reviewer.
• DISPUTE: As described in §3.3.5, every iteration, M = 0.5N
of the labeled “non-vulnerable” files are selected based on how
much the active learner disagrees with their current labels. It
then pushes the selected files back into the queue and asks
a different human expert for double-checking. In simulations,
these double checks have the same false negative rate ER.
• DISPUTE(3): Similar to DISPUTE but selected files are in-
spected by two humans (so “vulnerable” files are less likely to
be missed again albeit doubling the double-checking cost).
5.4.2 Experimental Result
RQ3: Is HARMLESS’s performance affected by human er-
rors? To show how human errors affect the performance, we
take the results from HARMLESS with Text, target recall = 95%
(Table 5) as baseline result and test the same algorithm with human
error rate increasing from 0% to 50%. Column None in Table 6
shows the relative performances against the baseline result if no
error correction is applied. As we can see, with 50% human error
rate, the final recall becomes half of that of baseline recall.
Yes. Human errors during the inspection process can
adversely affect the performance of HARMLESS. For
example, human agents with 50% recall result in a de-
terioration of recall from 96% to 48%.
RQ3: Is HARMLESS’s performance affected by human
errors?
14. The inflection (or “elbow”) point has the longest distance to the line
between the recall starting point and endpoint [32].
The large deterioration in recall motivates the next question.
RQ4: Can HARMLESS correct human errors effectively?
Table 6 compares DISPUTE and DISPUTE(3), the error correction
methods from HARMLESS, against two state-of-the-art error
correction methods, Two-person and Cormack’17. One method
is considered better than another if it achieves higher recall with
a lower cost. From the last line of Table 6, we observe that all
error correction methods achieve much higher recall than None
(i.e. no error correction). That is, error correction is strongly rec-
ommended when human inspectors are fallible. Also, in Table 6:
• Cormack’17 costs least among all the error correction methods,
but also achieves lower recall. Given recall as highest priority,
Cormack’17 is not recommended.
• DISPUTE is better than Two-person; i.e. it achieves similar
recalls at less cost. For example, when ER = 50%, DISPUTE
reaches 0.74 × 0.96 = 71% recall with 1.51 × 0.26 = 39%
cost while Two-person reaches 0.75× 0.96 = 72% recall with
2.06× 0.26 = 54% cost.
• DISPUTE(3) is also better than Two-person; i.e. it achieves
higher recall with similar cost (achieves 0.86 × 0.96 = 83%
recall with 1.96× 0.26 = 51% cost when ER = 50%).
• Compared to DISPUTE, DISPUTE(3) costs more but also
corrects more errors. Therefore one can always increase the
number of humans rechecking the files selected by DISPUTE
to reach higher recall with higher cost.
• The coverage of false negatives by DISPUTE is
Relative Recall−(1−ER)
(1−ER)ER =
0.74−0.5
0.25 = 96% when ER = 50%.
This supports the core hypothesis of DISPUTE; i.e. most
human errors (96%) are in files selected by DISPUTE (50% of
the labeled files). Hence, we say:
Yes. HARMLESS corrects more human errors with fewer
double checks when compared to other state-of-the-art
error correction methods. It double-checks 50% of the
labeled files but covers 96% of the missing vulnerabilities.
RQ4: Can HARMLESS correct human errors effec-
tively?
According to our results, when targeting all types of vulner-
abilities at 95% recall with human having 50% chance of fail-
ing to detect a vulnerability during the inspection, HARMLESS
with DISPUTE(3) can reach 0.95 × 0.85 = 81% recall for
0.21 × 1.86 = 39% cost, which means 81% of the vulnerable
files can be identified by inspecting 11,230 files. Although this
is still a large amount of human effort, it is much better than
the traditional vulnerability inspection applied in mission-critical
projects without HARMLESS [15]:
• Without HARMLESS, one engineer would only find 50% of the
vulnerabilities, and only after inspecting 28,750 files (100% of
the files);
• Without HARMLESS, two engineers would find 75% of the
vulnerabilities, but only after inspecting 57,500 files (200% of
the files including double-checking effort).
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Limitations
There exist several limitations in this work that we plan to resolve
in the future:
• All the experiments in this work are conducted at file level
granularity. Currently, Cost is measured as the number of files
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TABLE 6: Experimental Results for Target 3 Human Error Correction
Error Relative Recall = Relative Cost =
Rate Vulnerability Type Observed Recall / Baseline Recall (from Table 5) Observed Cost / Baseline Cost (from Table 5)
(ER) None Two-person Cormack’17 DISPUTE DISPUTE(3) None Two-person Cormack’17 DISPUTE DISPUTE(3)
0%
Protection Mechanism Failure 100 ( 1 ) 100 ( 1 ) 91 ( 8 ) 98 ( 2 ) 98 ( 2 ) 100 ( 11 ) 200 ( 22 ) 60 ( 22 ) 128 ( 27 ) 171 ( 36 )
Resource Management Errors 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 96 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 5 ) 200 ( 10 ) 56 ( 13 ) 149 ( 7 ) 198 ( 9 )
Data Processing Errors 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 96 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 99 ( 12 ) 199 ( 24 ) 69 ( 21 ) 137 ( 13 ) 181 ( 17 )
Code Quality 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 89 ( 6 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 6 ) 200 ( 12 ) 43 ( 13 ) 145 ( 8 ) 192 ( 12 )
Other 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 78 ( 17 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 10 ) 200 ( 20 ) 43 ( 34 ) 144 ( 11 ) 190 ( 10 )
All 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 95 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 200 ( 0 ) 47 ( 6 ) 150 ( 1 ) 201 ( 2 )
Median 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 95 ( 7 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 100 ( 6 ) 200 ( 13 ) 52 ( 22 ) 146 ( 13 ) 192 ( 19 )
10%
Protection Mechanism Failure 90 ( 3 ) 99 ( 1 ) 87 ( 12 ) 96 ( 2 ) 97 ( 2 ) 97 ( 8 ) 199 ( 26 ) 58 ( 31 ) 116 ( 14 ) 148 ( 35 )
Resource Management Errors 91 ( 4 ) 98 ( 1 ) 95 ( 1 ) 99 ( 1 ) 99 ( 1 ) 102 ( 11 ) 199 ( 15 ) 57 ( 16 ) 147 ( 14 ) 197 ( 19 )
Data Processing Errors 90 ( 3 ) 100 ( 3 ) 90 ( 14 ) 98 ( 3 ) 100 ( 2 ) 105 ( 11 ) 201 ( 24 ) 61 ( 30 ) 140 ( 15 ) 180 ( 28 )
Code Quality 91 ( 6 ) 98 ( 3 ) 86 ( 5 ) 100 ( 2 ) 100 ( 0 ) 101 ( 8 ) 200 ( 17 ) 46 ( 28 ) 151 ( 10 ) 195 ( 7 )
Other 92 ( 4 ) 100 ( 0 ) 92 ( 12 ) 100 ( 1 ) 100 ( 0 ) 101 ( 8 ) 200 ( 16 ) 59 ( 44 ) 145 ( 10 ) 191 ( 8 )
All 90 ( 2 ) 99 ( 0 ) 92 ( 1 ) 98 ( 0 ) 100 ( 0 ) 99 ( 1 ) 200 ( 2 ) 49 ( 4 ) 149 ( 2 ) 200 ( 1 )
Median 90 ( 4 ) 99 ( 2 ) 91 ( 9 ) 98 ( 2 ) 100 ( 1 ) 100 ( 9 ) 200 ( 15 ) 54 ( 23 ) 146 ( 14 ) 193 ( 21 )
20%
Protection Mechanism Failure 80 ( 1 ) 95 ( 2 ) 82 ( 9 ) 96 ( 4 ) 97 ( 3 ) 103 ( 11 ) 196 ( 26 ) 63 ( 26 ) 130 ( 23 ) 155 ( 37 )
Resource Management Errors 79 ( 2 ) 96 ( 2 ) 91 ( 5 ) 95 ( 2 ) 97 ( 2 ) 105 ( 11 ) 204 ( 22 ) 60 ( 4 ) 147 ( 15 ) 196 ( 19 )
Data Processing Errors 78 ( 9 ) 93 ( 5 ) 87 ( 28 ) 93 ( 3 ) 98 ( 3 ) 102 ( 9 ) 204 ( 28 ) 64 ( 38 ) 140 ( 15 ) 180 ( 20 )
Code Quality 86 ( 12 ) 96 ( 3 ) 79 ( 17 ) 96 ( 6 ) 98 ( 3 ) 105 ( 5 ) 210 ( 19 ) 39 ( 15 ) 154 ( 17 ) 197 ( 5 )
Other 82 ( 7 ) 97 ( 4 ) 86 ( 20 ) 96 ( 6 ) 100 ( 0 ) 98 ( 11 ) 202 ( 26 ) 49 ( 41 ) 147 ( 14 ) 191 ( 13 )
All 79 ( 2 ) 96 ( 1 ) 87 ( 2 ) 95 ( 1 ) 99 ( 0 ) 97 ( 2 ) 199 ( 3 ) 49 ( 7 ) 148 ( 4 ) 200 ( 3 )
Median 80 ( 6 ) 96 ( 3 ) 86 ( 11 ) 95 ( 3 ) 98 ( 3 ) 101 ( 11 ) 201 ( 22 ) 52 ( 28 ) 145 ( 15 ) 194 ( 19 )
30%
Protection Mechanism Failure 68 ( 2 ) 91 ( 4 ) 65 ( 17 ) 88 ( 3 ) 93 ( 3 ) 101 ( 4 ) 201 ( 26 ) 40 ( 43 ) 116 ( 18 ) 160 ( 38 )
Resource Management Errors 74 ( 8 ) 90 ( 4 ) 84 ( 5 ) 91 ( 5 ) 96 ( 2 ) 104 ( 9 ) 199 ( 14 ) 69 ( 20 ) 147 ( 14 ) 209 ( 22 )
Data Processing Errors 75 ( 6 ) 90 ( 11 ) 84 ( 7 ) 90 ( 3 ) 95 ( 6 ) 105 ( 9 ) 204 ( 21 ) 59 ( 21 ) 148 ( 12 ) 179 ( 22 )
Code Quality 72 ( 3 ) 93 ( 6 ) 82 ( 8 ) 86 ( 6 ) 96 ( 2 ) 108 ( 5 ) 206 ( 11 ) 43 ( 43 ) 168 ( 13 ) 210 ( 19 )
Other 70 ( 4 ) 87 ( 4 ) 81 ( 14 ) 90 ( 6 ) 97 ( 2 ) 105 ( 8 ) 197 ( 26 ) 45 ( 52 ) 152 ( 16 ) 190 ( 12 )
All 70 ( 5 ) 91 ( 0 ) 82 ( 4 ) 90 ( 1 ) 97 ( 1 ) 96 ( 6 ) 197 ( 7 ) 47 ( 8 ) 142 ( 4 ) 196 ( 7 )
Median 70 ( 7 ) 91 ( 5 ) 82 ( 10 ) 90 ( 4 ) 96 ( 3 ) 103 ( 11 ) 200 ( 18 ) 52 ( 40 ) 148 ( 17 ) 192 ( 21 )
40%
Protection Mechanism Failure 55 ( 11 ) 84 ( 3 ) 67 ( 10 ) 81 ( 4 ) 89 ( 5 ) 101 ( 13 ) 205 ( 35 ) 62 ( 50 ) 149 ( 19 ) 170 ( 57 )
Resource Management Errors 61 ( 7 ) 82 ( 2 ) 77 ( 7 ) 82 ( 4 ) 91 ( 3 ) 107 ( 11 ) 213 ( 15 ) 58 ( 14 ) 154 ( 38 ) 202 ( 13 )
Data Processing Errors 65 ( 0 ) 84 ( 6 ) 68 ( 9 ) 82 ( 8 ) 90 ( 4 ) 105 ( 5 ) 214 ( 12 ) 63 ( 29 ) 147 ( 19 ) 199 ( 13 )
Code Quality 75 ( 3 ) 86 ( 6 ) 72 ( 6 ) 82 ( 6 ) 86 ( 6 ) 108 ( 6 ) 209 ( 17 ) 45 ( 32 ) 162 ( 16 ) 208 ( 17 )
Other 60 ( 10 ) 85 ( 4 ) 73 ( 12 ) 82 ( 8 ) 90 ( 1 ) 107 ( 12 ) 202 ( 24 ) 44 ( 29 ) 152 ( 19 ) 197 ( 13 )
All 59 ( 1 ) 82 ( 1 ) 72 ( 3 ) 83 ( 2 ) 93 ( 2 ) 89 ( 3 ) 191 ( 5 ) 56 ( 13 ) 145 ( 16 ) 198 ( 8 )
Median 61 ( 9 ) 83 ( 4 ) 71 ( 9 ) 82 ( 5 ) 90 ( 4 ) 105 ( 11 ) 204 ( 25 ) 57 ( 24 ) 151 ( 21 ) 199 ( 16 )
50%
Protection Mechanism Failure 51 ( 5 ) 76 ( 3 ) 59 ( 18 ) 70 ( 4 ) 81 ( 5 ) 112 ( 14 ) 203 ( 27 ) 58 ( 43 ) 146 ( 41 ) 184 ( 11 )
Resource Management Errors 50 ( 5 ) 73 ( 8 ) 68 ( 8 ) 72 ( 6 ) 86 ( 2 ) 112 ( 13 ) 216 ( 19 ) 81 ( 15 ) 154 ( 20 ) 205 ( 29 )
Data Processing Errors 48 ( 5 ) 73 ( 8 ) 31 ( 34 ) 81 ( 9 ) 89 ( 6 ) 107 ( 8 ) 217 ( 23 ) 36 ( 30 ) 148 ( 7 ) 200 ( 11 )
Code Quality 51 ( 3 ) 81 ( 9 ) 62 ( 15 ) 75 ( 5 ) 87 ( 8 ) 110 ( 7 ) 219 ( 14 ) 61 ( 27 ) 166 ( 12 ) 215 ( 12 )
Other 49 ( 2 ) 74 ( 12 ) 65 ( 17 ) 71 ( 8 ) 85 ( 7 ) 108 ( 9 ) 207 ( 21 ) 34 ( 68 ) 162 ( 11 ) 202 ( 16 )
All 50 ( 1 ) 74 ( 4 ) 68 ( 3 ) 74 ( 1 ) 85 ( 3 ) 96 ( 4 ) 193 ( 19 ) 66 ( 9 ) 136 ( 17 ) 186 ( 18 )
Median 50 ( 4 ) 75 ( 7 ) 65 ( 20 ) 74 ( 7 ) 86 ( 6 ) 110 ( 11 ) 206 ( 25 ) 64 ( 45 ) 154 ( 21 ) 197 ( 23 )
This table shows the experimental results when human error rate ER increases from 0% to 50%. Baseline recall and cost come from Table 5,
Row Text, Column 95. All the numbers are percentages and in the format of median(IQR) from 30 repeated simulations. Each row presents
performances on one group of target vulnerability types in the Mozilla Firefox dataset as described in Table 1. The “Median” row summarizes
the median performance across all groups. The “None” columns show the performance of HARMLESS without any error correction method
while other columns each reports the performance with a different error correction method. One method is considered better than another if it
has higher relative recall and lower relative cost.
inspected. This can be improved since the effort to inspect
a file can vary significantly. Also, if HARMLESS can make
predictions based on functions or specific lines of code instead
of an entire file, it would save time and effort for the human
inspector to look for potential vulnerabilities.
• Human errors are simulated randomly in the current work. In
practice, many factors can affect the human error rate, e.g.
the level of expertise of the inspector, or some certain type of
vulnerabilities might be harder to find.
• Our simulation is based on data collected from reported security
vulnerabilities and bugs. As a result, our dataset does not
provide information on whether an actual incident was caused
by the identified vulnerabilities. Therefore, we do not separate
these two types of vulnerabilities in the simulation and we do
not know what percentage of the identified vulnerabilities were
involved in actual security incidents.
• Low precision issue: maintaining a considerably high precision
is important for such an inspection tool to be accepted and used
in practice, e.g. if the human inspector finds no vulnerabilities
from 10 source code files suggested by the tool, then he or she
may quickly lose faith in that tool and stop using it. Although the
current HARMLESS tool looks promising in terms of recall and
percentage of cost saved, it has low precision. As an example, in
Table 4, HARMLESS reaches 95% recall with 20% cost when
targeting all types of vulnerabilities using text mining features.
This also means HARMLESS finds 257 vulnerable files by
asking humans to inspect 5,750 files, which results in less than
5% precision (1 vulnerable file can be identified for every 22
files inspected). It might be acceptable in some mission-critical
systems but generally speaking, users do not want to inspect 22
files only to find one vulnerability since it may take hours of
careful work to inspect one source code file.
6.2 Threats to Validity
There are several validity threats [50] to the design of this study.
Any conclusions made from this work must be considered with
the following issues in mind:
16
Conclusion validity focuses on the significance of the treat-
ment. To enhance conclusion validity, we ran each simulation 30
times with different random seeds.
Internal validity focuses on how sure we can be that the
treatment caused the outcome. To enhance internal validity, we
heavily constrained our experiments to the same dataset, with the
same settings, except for the treatments being compared.
Construct validity focuses on the relation between the theory
behind the experiment and the observation. This applies to our
analysis of which feature set provides the best performance. There
are two concerns here.
Firstly, when we conclude that software metrics features per-
form worst (i.e., it contributes little to the vulnerability prediction),
other reasons such as the choice of classifier (different classifiers
might work better with different feature sets) might be the real
cause of the observation.
Secondly, like any other data mining paper we are susceptible
to biases in the labeling of the data used to test/train this method.
We have some confidence in that labeling (since two graduate
students spent months of work carefully collecting those ground
truth labels). Nevertheless, these two oracles could have made
some systematic errors in their labeling (e.g. favoring certain
kinds of vulnerabilities, and not others). To partially mitigate this
problem, we make our data and methods available15 and commit
to helping (as requested) other research groups working on this
data.
External validity concerns how widely our conclusions can
be applied. All the conclusions in this study are drawn from the
experiments running on the Mozilla Firefox vulnerability dataset.
When applied to other case studies, the following concerns might
arise: 1) crash dump stack trace data may not be available; 2)
the same settings that work on Mozilla Firefox dataset might
not provide the best performance on other datasets. One possible
solution to this problem can be hyperparameter tuning which
adapts the parameter settings to the target dataset.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Reducing software security vulnerabilities is a crucial task of
software development. However, inspecting code to find vulner-
abilities is a tedious and time-consuming task. Hence, this paper
introduces and evaluates HARMLESS, an active learning-based
vulnerability prediction framework. HARMLESS focuses on (1)
saving cost when reaching different levels of recall, (2) providing a
practical way to stop at the target recall, and (3) correcting human
errors efficiently.
This approach was tested on a Mozilla Firefox dataset using
a simulation methodology. Given actual vulnerabilities reported,
we run multiple what-if simulations where we run over that
data using a variety of code inspection strategies. The goal of
these inspections is to determine what might have happened if
these strategies were applied for finding vulnerabilities before the
software is released.
What we found was that using text mining features alone,
HARMLESS decreases the cost to reach high recall for finding
vulnerabilities before deployment, and if runtime data is avail-
able (e.g. the crash features used above), then that can boost
vulnerability prediction in the early stages. We also showed that
the total number of vulnerabilities in one software project can
15. https://github.com/ai-se/Mozilla Firefox Vulnerability Data
TABLE 7: Comparison to the state-of-the-art frameworks
HARMLESS Supervised orSemi-supervised Unsupervised
Can reach any
target recall
Guide on how to
reach target recall
Can start without
known vulnerabilities
Work without
other indicators
Utilize continuous
human feedback
Correct human
errors efficiently
be accurately estimated during the active learning process, thus
providing a reliable stopping rule for the approach. Based on our
results, HARMLESS can save 77, 70, 53% of the cost (compared
to reviewing and testing source code files in a random order)
when applying the SEMI estimator to stop at 90, 95, 99% recall,
respectively. Note that these results indicate that HARMLESS can
result in, by practitioner choice, a recall value close to 100% given
trade-offs in recall and cost. Practitioners can have confidence
that, if they so choose and have the resources to spare, 99% of
the vulnerabilities would be identified without inspecting most of
the source code. Meanwhile, HARMLESS can cover 96% of the
human missing vulnerable files by double-checking 50% of the
inspected files, thus saving more effort when correcting human
errors.
Table 7 compares the advantages of HARMLESS with other
approaches to vulnerability prediction, i.e. supervised or semi-
supervised approaches [16], [7], [26] and unsupervised ap-
proaches [28], [8], [29]. We assert that HARMLESS does best
due to (a) the capability to make full use of continuous human
feedback, (b) the guidance of when to stop inspections, and (c) the
human error correction strategy.
That said, HARMLESS still suffers from the low precision
problem as discussed in §6.1. Even after the reduction, the inspec-
tion effort required is still very high (inspecting 5,750 files in our
case study). Therefore much research is required to further reduce
the effort associated with vulnerability inspection. There are two
possible directions for further cost reduction: (a) increasing the
precision by improving the model’s prediction, and (b) reducing
the cost of every false alarm.
As for improving the model’s prediction:
• Combining text mining features with other vulnerability-
proneness metrics might improve the model’s performance as
suggested by the Hybrid results.
• Although our current way of using semi-supervised learning
did not produce better results, it is still possible to improve
HARMLESS’s performance by better utilizing the information
from unlabeled data. For example, semi-supervised learning
could become a pre-filter that removes from consideration the
files that are less likely to contain vulnerabilities.
• This work applies some best practice settings (featurization,
classifier, active learning, etc.) from other domains, this does
not necessarily be the best practice for proactive vulnerability
prediction. Further testing of other settings and tuning of the
parameters might provide improved results on this specific
domain.
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As for reducing the cost of every false alarm:
• One direction is to predict based on function level or lines of
code level, so that the cost of every false alarm becomes the
human effort of inspecting one line of code instead of one file.
• The other direction is to facilitate the inspection by highlighting
which part of the code in the file contains terms used by the
prediction model.
Apart from the low precision issue, considering the limitations
and validity threats of the current work, other future works could
include:
1) The community requires more dataset like the Mozilla Firefox
vulnerability dataset we described in this paper. Hence we
encourage software engineering researchers to collect more
high-quality vulnerability datasets and test the generalizability
of vulnerability prediction algorithms.
2) Solicit opinions on the results from the development team that
would take action based on the results. In our study, we reached
out to contacts at the Mozilla Foundation, but did not get a
response. In the future, field research should be conducted with
real human inspectors using HARMLESS.
3) As shown in §5.4, different level of human error rate ER
requires different error correction methods. E.g. if ER = 0,
using DISPUTE will cost 46% more than not using any error
correction; and at high error rate ER = 50%, DISPUTE(3)
is more desired than DISPUTE. Therefore how to accurately
estimate or measure the human error rate and adjust the
error correction method correspondingly becomes an important
future work.
4) Check generality of the active learning framework by applying
it to other total recall problems in software engineering. The
authors are already exploring SE problems like test case
prioritization, technical debt detection, and static warning iden-
tification. Preliminary results suggest that the active learning
framework discussed here might be widely applicable to many
SE problems.
We hope that this work will lay down a foundation and motivate
further research on active learning-based vulnerability prediction.
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